

Central Intelligence Agency



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

03 October 1988

North Korea: Seeking China's Western Technology	25X1
Summary	
North Korea is working hard to modernize its defense industry and acquire advanced weapons to counter force improvements in the South. As in the past, P'yongyang needs its Communist allies for help Moscow has been the most responsive, but given past Sino-North Korean military cooperation, the similarities between military inventories in both countries, and the economic advantages to the North of upgrading existing equipment with new technology, we believe Beijing is also of key significance for P'yongyang. China's steady military modernization, using infusions of Western military technology, has increasingly given it the capability to offer assistance to the North Koreans—perhaps in part to offset growing Soviet influence.	25X1 25¥1 25X
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis we contributions from analysts in the China Division. Information available as of 03 Office of East Asian Analysis was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be	ctober
directed to the Chief, Security and Technology Issues, Northeast Asia Division, OEA	
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	probably will refrain from offering sophisticated COCOM-controlled	
	technology that could provoke a strong reaction from the United States, it may be less inhibited in transfering noncontrolled technology acquired from other Western sources.	
The No	orth's Search for Military Assistance	
	Over the years, P'yongyang has received important military assistance from its Since the mid-1980s it has turned to them for help in modernizing its forces. Moscow has been the major benefactor; in May	
since 1 includir	e Soviets resumed deliveries of major weapons systems to the Norththe first 973. Moscow initially provided older technology to improve air defenses, of a regiment of MIG-23 interceptorspresumably to compensate for US F-16s by Seouland SA-3 and improved SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs),	
deploye the arri equipm	ed around P'yongyang. Deliveries of SA-5 long-range SAMs followed, and with val of SU-25 ground attack fighters in late 1987, the Soviets began delivering ent that augments the offensive striking power of the North's ground forces. In	
	388 the Soviets provided some of their most advanced weaponry, delivering 12 sa formidable fighter that became operational in the USSR only four years ago.	
effort a coopera 1987.	North Korea also has sought technical assistance for its military modernization nd here again the Soviets have responded. P'yongyang signed a scientific ation accord with Moscow in October 1985 and concluded a new agreement in Also in 1987, North Korea signed a science and technology (S&T) agreement with a according to press reports. The accords will facilitate scientific exchanges, but	2
P'yongy	ow and equipment its allies already have gathered	
China-	-The Record and Our Concerns	
the 196	China was a key supplier of weapons and related technology to North Korea in Os and 1970s, but it appears to have been less helpful in the 1980s. In fact, Beijing's assistance may have peaked early in the decade. hina delivered 40 F-7 jet fighters and four Osa-class quided-missile patrol boats.	
	China also helped the North establish a jet fighter factory.	

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the conseque	ences of Beijing providing even marginal help,	
the conseque	makes Chinese aid a critical issue	
B		
military mode military coop	have a larger role than we have heretofore credited in the North' ernization. Most obvious, the two nations remain allies, with a hoeration dating to the Korean war. Moreover, North Korea—in things few places to turn to obtain equipment that matches its own	istory of s area in
	hat might be available on the low-budget terms P'yongyang can	
	North Korea's vantage, we believe China is an attractive source of	of military
	or other reasons as well. Since the 1970s,	mant and
production te information to	na has amassed a substantial inventory of Western military equip echnology, including complete weapon production factories, techi to upgrade the capabilities of <u>current weapon</u> systems, and techn	nical ology that
	itary and civilian applications China has applied to production equipment, and know-how to improving a military inv	
is similar to t to these Chin	the North'sproviding P'yongyang with obvious incentives to ganese investments as a cost effective way to upgrade military caped the life of older weapon systems.	in access
North in fact	sees China as a promising source of technical assistance for mi	the
modernization		ircary
tiesone obv December that consummated	vrean press also is playing up closer Chinese-North Korean techn vious sign of the North's priorities. The North Korean media repo at P'yongyang and Beijing had plans to sign a long-range S&T ac d, the pact would fit an emerging pattern of North Korean agreen allies who operate successful technology acquistion programs. 2	orted last cord. If
² The delay i	may turn on what P'yongyang hopes for and what Beijing is willi	ng to give.

What Mig	ght North Korea want from China?	
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is investin and in sup	e real military needs would turn P'yongyang toward China for help. Ing its own scarce resources heavily in expanding and improving the pporting the defense industry, and there are a range of areas in which could provide important aid:	military
	the ground, the Chinese have made improvements in armor and me	chanized
ford	ces that could boost P'yongyang's capabilities.	
	aircraft, the North is working hard to upgrade its firstline fighter	
	cemostly F-7s, China's version of the Soviet MIG-21. China's Wes uipment would provide immediate benefits.	tern
• At s	sea North Korea is already asking the Chinese for help to ungrade a	
	sea, North Korea is already asking the Chinese for help to upgrade r apons.	avai
	ts defense industries, Beijing has much technology P'yongyang could grade its expanding plants. China's foreign acquisition of dual-use te	
has	focused on sophisticated items such as computers, telecommunica	tions,
mic	trumentation, machine tools, aerospace production equipment and co croelectronics, and complex chemicals. In addition to advanced equi	
	th probably would be interested in specialized military know-how.	

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
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	COPY	19 LTC GEORGE R. FISHER, DOD/OJCS/J-5/NORTHEAST ASIA, RM 2D977,	25
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